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IN THE SUPPE}.1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
-v-

F.DWARD HOUSER,

Case No.

CR 81-558

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF

APPELLPu~T

STATEMENT OF THE

~ATURE

OF THE CASE

Edward Houser appeals from a conviction and judgment
of Theft by Receiving, a Felony of the Second De8ree,
and of Carrying a Concealed and Dangerous

Wea~on,

a Pelony of

the Third Dep,ree, in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B.
Dee, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITIO~

IN THE LOWER COURT

Appellant, Edward Houser, was charged with Theft by
Receiving, a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated §76-6-408 (1953 as amended), and wit1i. Carrying
a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Felony of the Third Degree, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-10-504 (1953 as amended).
He was convicted of both charges in a jury trial and was subsequently sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison
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for the indeterminate concurrent terms of 1 to 15 vears and
0 to 5 years respectively.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and
judgment rendered below ans asks to have the case remanded
to the Third Judicial District Court for a new trial or to
have the judgment vacated and a judgment of acquittal entered.

STATE:MENT OF THE FACTS
On December 14, 1980, a burglary occurred at the
home of Dr. and Mrs. Broadbent sometime between the hours of
noon and 4:00 p.m.

When they returned horn from church, they

found a number of items missing from their home and their house
in a shambles. (15 T. at 54-56) 1 The missing ite~s included
jewelry, a watch, a pen set, birth certificates, clinic cards,
and a check from a tenant made out to Dr. Broadbent. (15 T. at
61-71).

It was stipulated by the parties that the amount of

the items was greater than $1,000. (20 T. at 2).

The Broadbents

also found two spent bullets in their home. (15 T. at 57).
On January 1, 1981 Mr. Houser was arrested bv Officer

1. All references to the trial transcript from July 15
1981 will be designated as "15 T."; references to the '
~ransc~ipt from July 16, 1981 will be desi?,nated at
16 T. ;
and all references to the transcriot
from July 20, 1981 will be designated as "20 T."

-2-
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DeWitt.

This arrest was the subject of a motion to suppress mid-

trial.

During the course of that motion, Officer DeWitt was the

only witness.

He testified that he saw Mr. Houser about 4:00

p.m. on January 1, 1981, walking in an area near 717 South 200
East with some type of handcart for moving furniture. (15 T. at 82).
At this point, the officer observed no lettering on the handcart.

(15 T. at 88).

The officer watched Mr. Houser olace this handcart

into his stationwagon and then proceeded to stop Mr. Houser and
question him (15 T. at 84).
sons for doing so.

He testified that he had four rea-

One ":'1as that he knew that Mr. Houser had a

prior record, although

he was unaware of what Mr. Houser had

been arrested for, either at that time

or at the time of the

trial. (15 T. at 83-84; 96; 102-105).

The second reason was that

he had been at this same address about a week earlier in the
course of an eviction of Mr. Rouser's sister, and therefore, he
believed that Mr. Houser no longer lived at that address.
2

(15 T. at 83;

88~

.

The officer's third reason was that he

believed that he had seen most of Mr. Rouser's belongings a week
earlier and did not believe that Mr. Houser owned a handcart.
(15 T. at 90; 95-96).

The officer further testified that there

was very little pedestrian traffic in the area at the time. (15 T
at 95).

He subsequently added that the landlord had asked him to

2. 13ut see (15 T. at 102) where the officer states that he did not
know if defendant had moved out as yet.
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arrest anybody who came back to that address after the eviction.

(15 T. at 98).
After stopping Mr. Houser, Officer DeWitt asked Officer
Cahoon to take a look at the handcart in the

(15 T. at 85; 92-93;

96-97)~

stationwa~on.

Without opening the door to the

stationwagon, Officer Cahoon looked in and told Officer DeWitt
that the handcart said "Stokes Brothers" on it. (15 T. at 96;106).
Officer DeWitt subsequently told Officer Cahoon to bring the
cart to him. (15 T. at 94;96).

No contact was made with Stokes

Brothers at this time and the officers had no reports of either
a theft or a burglary. (15 T. at 86; 88-89; 94-95).

There were

no questions and no conversation about what Mr. Houser was doing
in the neighborhood. (15 T. at 91-92; 100-101).
Mr. Houser was then arrested by Officer DeWitt.
backpackin Mr. Rouser's possession was searched,

yieldin~

A
some

of the items from the Broadbents' home and a revolver. (15 T. at 76).
The officer testified that he could not feel the revolver through
the exterior of the pack. (15 T. at 76).

At a later date,

Mr. Houser ac-.companied another officer, Officer Gillies, back
to the premises where he was arrested.

At that time, a pen set

of the Broadbents'was recovered from the premises. (16 T. at 32;

92).

Mr. Houser also located other items from the Broadbent's home

and gave them voluntarily to the police. (16 T. at 47; 63).
The rest of the testimony at trial came from Mr. Houser
and some statements that Mr. Houser made to nfficer
interviewed by the officer on ·January

5, 1981.

~illies

when

The evidence
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was that, on

~ecember

14, 1980, Mr. Houser was at the address of

717 South 200 East. The Defendant had returned to these premises
to board up the place because it had been burglarized a dav or
two before. (16 T. at 68-69; 106-109).

Two people came over,

a man and a woman, subsequently identified as Ralph Schimerald
and Lynette Gillman. (16 T. at 24; 28; 67-69; 109).

They arrived

somewhere between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. with various items that the
defendant subsequently identified as being from the Broadbents.

(16 T. at 25-26; 72).

Mr. Schimerald was injured by a gunshot

and was brought into the house by Mr. Houser and Ms. Gillman.

(16 T. at 41-42; 70; 110).

Mr. Schimerald ,refused to go to

the hospital at Mr. Rouser's suggestion. (16 T. at 41-42; 71).
Ms. Gillman asked Mr. Houser to help her sort the jewelry items
into precious metals and non-precious metals.
refused to do. (16 T. at 73).

This Mr. Houser

However, he did take Ms. Gillman

and show her two places where she could later take the items
to find outwhichwere precious metals. (16 T. at 27;

7L~-75;

113).

He did not help her sell them in any way and in fact refused
to

Mr.

acc~pt

any items that were offerred to him. (16 T. at 76-77).

Houser

did tell Officer Gillies, however, that he knew those

items were stolen.

(16 T. at 24; 29).

In fact, Mr. Schimerald

and Ms. Gillman had told him that Mr. Schimerald had just shot
himself in the course of a burglary. (16 T. at 70; 73).
On December 17,

200 East.

1980

Mr. Houser

r"1ent back to 717 South

At that time niether Mr. Schimerald nor Ms. Gillman

were there. (16 T. at 77; 114).

However,

Mr. Houser
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observed

a sawed off shotgun in a closet crawl space at that residence.
(16 T. at 114).

He did not remove the shotgun at that time.

He also returned around December 20 and again on December 31.
On December 31, Mr. Houser observed that the sawed off shotgun
was in the trunk of a 1969 Buick of his that was parked out
in front of the residence. (20 T. at 24-25).

Earlier that

evening, he had seen Mr. Schimerald at a party and at that time
discovered that these items belonged to a Dr. Broadbent.
(16 T. at 79).

Mr. Houser bought some of the items from Mr.

Schimerald with the intent to return them to Dr. Broadbent.
In particular he bought a

wat~h

that he thought would have

sentimental value to the Broadbents. (16 T. at 81-83; 103).
Mr. Houser, his girlfriend, and his daughter spent the night at
717 South 200 East.

At that time or the next day, Mr. Houser found

a revolver outside of the window. (16 T. at 87; 121).

Because

the house had just been burglarized again a few days earlier, it
was his belief that the revolver had been inadvertently dropped
by the burglars. (15 T. at 23; 122).

Mr. Houser picked up the

revolver with · a· pen intending not to leave any fingerprints
on it so that possibly the police could found out who had broken
into the residence and taken his belongings. (16 T. at 40; 88).
Early on January 1, 1981, Mr. Houser, his girlfriend,
and his daughter decided to go to a local miniature mart to get
something to eat. (16 T. at 89-90).

Prior to that time Mr.

Houser had placed the revolver in the center compartment of his
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pack and the belongings of the Broadbents in another compartment
of his pack.

(16 T. at 90; 96; 122).

Because the pack was heavy

with many items, Mr. Houser did not at first realize that the revolver was in the pack when they started to the miniature mart.
When he suddenly remembered the gun, he decided to leave it
where it was.

He said that he was afraid that, if he left it

in the house, the burglars would come back looking for it.

He

was also worried that, if he took it out of his pack, he would
be arrested and taken to jail for having a firearm in his
hand on the street.

Therefore, he decided to leave it in the

pack while he went to the miniature mart. (16 T. at 90-91; 104).
It was later that day that he was arrested and had those items
in his pack. (16 T. at 92).
Mr. Houser further testified that he did not wish to
~o

to the police initially with the items from the Broadbents

because he wanted to return them to the Broadbents without
any police involvement.

He had previously testified in another

burglary case for the state and, as a result of that testimony,
he was harrassed, called a snitch, and vandalized.
he thought

So this time

he could return the items without incurring that

type of harrasment. (20 T. at 15-18).

Mr. Houser agreed to

testify against Ralph Schimerald and Lynette Gillman when he was
asked to by the officers. (16 T. at 98; 130-131).

However, he

was never subpoenaed and never did so testify. (16 T. at 103) .

3

3. Although Officer Gillies clai~ed he believed that Mr. Houser was
subpoenaed, (16 T. 49), he later recanted his testimony. (16 T. at
54).
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Nevertheless, the officers did state that Mre Houser was cooperative.

It was through Mr. Houser that the officers were

able to obtain the names of the two who had in fact burglarized
the Broadbents and were able to regain much of the property
that had been lost by the Broadbents. (16 T. at 36; 99-102;
125-126; 20 T. at 21).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
A

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SUSPICION' TO STOP
A...~D DETAIN APPELLANT
Utah Code Annotated

~77-7-15

(1953 as amended) oro-

vides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed ·or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit
a public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
If such a person is properly detained, an officer has a further
right to "frisk the person for a dangerous weapon

if he

reasonably believes he or any other person is in dang.er."
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-16 (1953 as amended).

The offieer

in this case satisfied niether of these statutes.
Constitutional standards for a detention of a person
not amounting to an arrest were outlined by the United States
Suoreme Court in Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.C. 1868,
20 L.Ed 2nd 889 (1968).

In determinin?, the reasonableness of

any such seizure
and
subsequent
search'
t''ho
rn,,,....,..
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum
and Library ~+-"'.]+-~~
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

[In]
justifying the particular intrusion
the police officer trust be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together, with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonabl·" warrant that
intrusion.
Id- at 21.
The Cou,...t f 11 rt'her admonished that the "good faith" of rhe
officer was not in and of itself sufficient.

~iestion

InsteRd, Rn

in assessing this stop is:
Would the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the seizure or search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" th.qt the af"tinn t.qke-n wa~ apnropr4 ate?
Td. at 22

This type of. search cannot be based on "mere curiosity, rumor
or

-~~hunch."

Ih

Re:

Tony C., 582 P.2d957, 959 (Cal. 1978).

This Court has recognized
must be analyzed ·on its

0~11m

merits.

61 P.2d 103 (Utah, 1980) this

that each fact situation
In State v. Whittenback,

Court upheld

a

detention where

the officer, knowing thefts had o("cu,...ren in rhe .qre::l ann
th::lt dP.fendants had previously had contraband and a bag of coins,
observed the defendants alone in

a

laundromat.

The officers

subsequently conducted a consent search of defendants' vehicle.
More recently, this Court upheld a Terry stop in State v.
Ballenburger, 652P.2d927 (Utah 1982).

In that case, the officers

saw the defendants near their car in an empty shopping area at
3:00 a.rn.

This Court held that the lateness of the hour,

the suspicious activities of the defendants,

the knowledge
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of an increased rate of burglaries in the area, and the observation of radio equipment in defendants' car justified the stop.
The reasons articulated by the officer in this
case did not amount .to a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity
Appellant

was occurring.

Officer DeWitt testified that he saw

walking in an area near 717 South 200 Easto

Appellant was anoarently pulling or pushing an empty
handcart, which he put in his stationwagon.

At this point,

the Ofticer approached and detained Appellante
reasons

Officer DeWitt's

for detaining Appellant were:
A.

He knew that Appellant had a prior record

but he did not know the nature of that record
or what Appellant had previously been arrested
for;
B.

He knew Appellant's sister had been evicted

from the residence at 717 South 200 East a week
earlier and that Appellant no longer lived
there;
C.

He believed that he had seen most of

A~pellant's belongings previously and did not

think Appellant o-vmed a handcart;
D.

There was very little pedestrian traffic

in the area at the time;
E.

The landlord had asked him to arrest any-

one who came to the residence after the
eviction.
-10-
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These reasons, independently or collectively, fall short of
com~rising

specific and articulable facts and creating rational

inferences which warrant a reasonable suspicion to justify
detaining the Appellant.
Appellant's prior record would have indicated nothing
that would lead a reasonable officer to believe criminal
activity was presently occurring.

The police officer knew only

that Appellant had some kind of prior record.

He knew nothing

more about it, not even what type -of offenses were on the
record.

The officer also had no information that a theft had

occurred in the area.

However, even if the officer had

legitimately suspected a theft based on other information, he
stated that he had ·. no.· knowledge that there were theft
offenses on Appellant's record.

There is thus no rational

connection between stoppinP, Appellant and his record.
The eviction of Anpellant's sister from a residence
in the area or the officers belief as to the extent of
Appellant's belongings similarly
reason to detain him.

would not be a sufficient

The Officer said that he did not know

if Appellant had moved his belongings out of the residence, so
there was a logical explanation for his presence in the area
other than criminal activity.

Officer DeWitt further thought

that he had seen all of Appellant's belongings on a prior occasion
and did not think he

o~med

a handcart.

This reason is patently
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ridiculous and cannot substitute for specific facts or rational
inferences.

Appellant could have rented a cart, borrowed

it, or found one abandoned.

Regardless, he need not have owned

it in order to have legitimately had possession of ita

The fact that there was little pedestrian traffic
in the area is also not a reasonable suspicion that Appellant
was engaged in criminal activity.
Day on a residential street.

This fact is not a basis for

reasonable susicion of anything.
O'WI'l

It was 4:00 p.rn. on New Year's

Appellant was approaching his

car, placing a handcart beside it.

Appellant's mere

presence in an area with few other people would not warrant a
suspicion of criminal activity.
Officer DeWitt further said that the landlord had
told him to arrest anyone returning to the house.

Of course,-

citizens cannot tell oolice officers who to arrest and when to
make arrests.

The police

must

have their

o~m

reasonable

suspicions to detain anyone, and need orobable cause to make
arrests, not permission from citizens.

This was obviouslv not

a major reason for the detention in any event, as the officer never
even asked Appellant about his presence at the residence.
There were thus no specific and articulable facts
which would have caused the officer to reasonably suspect that
some criminal activity was occurring or that appellant was
involved that activity.

Unlike the facts in State v. Whittenback,

supra, or in Ballenbur~er, suora, the officer in this case had
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no knowledge of

prior

thefts in the area or that Appellant

in fact had contraband.

Without these threshold facts ,

confiscation of the handcart from the car and the subsequent
search of

Appellant

were impermissible.
~

THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S
VEHICLE WAS ILLEGAL
The Officers conducted a search of Appellant's
vehicle without a warrant after he was detained but before
he was arrested.
detention.

This search was the fruit of an illegal
,_,

But even assuming a proper detention, this was

not a search incident to arrest, nor is there evidence that it
was a consent search.

There was no stoo of a moving motor

vehicle or o.f Appellant in the vehicle, so this was not a situation where exigent circumstances existed to search the car.
The only faintly plausible exception to the warrant r·equirement
is the plain_vi. ew doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court defined the plain view
doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d
564, 91 S.C. 2022 (1971).

In Coolidge, the Court held that

plainviawcould not support the seizure of an automobile in
defendant's driveway where the officers knew in advance they
wanted to seize the car.

The Court stated that the common thread

of plain. vi.ew case "is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which
he -Cc?me inadvertently upon a piece of evidence incriminating the accused"
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and that " it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them." Ide at 466.

Examples cited by the

Court include contraband evidence discovered

while in "hot

pursuit" of a suspect or incident to an arrest on another matter.
The limitations on plain view are intended to guarantee the
Fourth

Amendment warrant requirements are not infringed upon.

The Court in Coolidge stated two objectives of the warrant
requirement: "to eliminate altogether searches not based on
·probable cause" and "that those s_earches deemed necessary
should be as limited as possible." Id. at 467.,

The requirement

of inadvertence of discovery and an innnediately apparent
incriminating nature of the evidence safeguard the Fourth
Amendment guarantees, but at the same time allow police to
perform their duties.
The warrantless seizure of the cart in this case did
not fall within the plainview exception.
no legitimate reason for the officer

First, there was

to be in the area. Even

assuming that the officer was legitimately there, however,
the discovery of the cart by them was neither inadvertent n~r
did it immediately appear to be incriminating.
·-·
saw no lettering on the cart himself.

Officer DeWitt

Instead, he instructed

Officer Cahoon specifically to approach the vehicle and examine
the cart.
discovery.

This was thus a calculated search, not an inadvertent
Moreover, the handcart was not clearly incriminating.

It did have the words "Stokes Brothers" orinted on it, but the
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police had no information regarding a burglary or theft of a
handcart from Stokes Brothers nor did they first verify if
any such information existed.

There were many legitimate

explanations other than criminal activity
possession of the handcart.

to explain Appellant's

There was, therefore, an illegal

seizure of the handcart without a warrant.

Because such illegally

seized evidence cannot be used to establish the probable cause
for an arrest,

Appellant's subsequent arrest and search

was improper.

c.
THERE WAS
APPELLA.~T

no

PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-2 (1953 as amended) provides:
A peace officer may make an arrest under
authority of a warrant or may, without,
warrant, arrest a person: (1) for
a.
public offense committed or
attempted in his presence; (2) when
he has reasonable cause to believe
a felonv has been committed and has
reasonable cause to believe that
the uerson arrested has coMMitted
it; .(3) when he has reasonable cause
to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing a person may;
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid
arrest; (b) destroy or conceal evidence
of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage
property belonging to another person.
In State v. Whittenback, supra, this Court recognized· the
standards set forth in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.C. 223,
13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1964),.and in an earlier Utah case for determining
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probable cause for arrest:
The determination should be made on an
objective standard: whether from the
facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent
person in his position would be
justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense.
621 P.2 at 106, quoting from State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318,
495 P.2d 1259 (1972).

In Whittenback,

where defendants were

convicted of theft from a laundromat, the officer not only
knew that thefts had been committed in the area, but also
he had observed bulges in defendant's pockets and lock
picks on the floor near defendants.
In this case, the nolice had no facts in which
to base a reasonable cause to believe that the Appellant
had committed any thefts.

The arrest occurred after the

handcart was illegally seized.

Although the

~ourt

in Whittenback

affirmed a search prior to the actual arrest, it was noted that
the officer in fact

had probable cause to arrest defendant prior

to conducting the search. 621 P.2d at 106.

In this case, no

probable cause existed even after the discovery of the handcart.
The Officer simply observed Appellant with what appeared to
be an unmarked handcart which he placed inside his car.

T~ile

the officer knew that Appellant had a record, he did not know
whether that included any theft charges.

Further, although

he did not think Appellant owned a handcart, there had been no
reports of thefts in the area.

Appellant's µresence in the area

-16-
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and eviction matter were irrelevant to whether there was probable cause regarding a stolen handcart.

Even assuming that

the seizure of the handcart was legal, the mere fact that
"Stokes Brothers" was on the handcart was not reasonable cause to
assume that criminal activity in the absence of a renort of
a theft or burglary.
by the officer.

Appellant was arrested on a mere hunch

No rational inference that a crime had been

committed, much less that Appellant had committed one, existed.
This illegal arrest thus renders the subsequent search
of the backpack inproper.

D.
SEARCH OF

APPELL~NT'S

BACKPACK WAS ILLEGAL

Without a reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant,
and without probable cause to search his car or to arrest
him, the subsequent search of his

back~ack

was illegal.

Con-

sequently, its contents should have been suppressed at the
trial.

These issues divide into two areas: (1)

~search

incident to arrest and (2) a search pursuant to a Terry ston
and frisk situation.
The major issue is whether the trial court should have
suppressed the contents of the backpack as a result of an illegal
arrest.

The United States Supreme Court in Mapn

U.S. 643, 6

L.Ed~

-V.

Ohio, 367

2d 1081, 81 S.C. 1684 (1961), set forth the

rule that evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the
Fourth Amendment is not admissible in state courts.

This rule

has been most often utilized in the context of suppressing
-17-
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confessions obtained after an illegal arrest.

Brown v. Illinois,

422 U S. 590, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416, 95 SoC. 2254 (1975); Wong Sun
0

v. United States, 371 UoS. 471, 9 L.Edo 2d 441, 83

S.C~

407 (1963)

The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter constitutional
0

•

~

violations and, thus, to preserve judicial integrity.
v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 599-600.

.

Brown

In this case, search

of Appellant's backpack was the result of his arrest without
probable cause for the theft of the handcarto

The evidence

gained from the search should, therefore, have been suppressed.
Moreover, even if the sear.ch is perceived as being
a result of the primary detention and not as the result
of the arrest, it was improper.

The authority to frisk for

such circumstances is limited to a search "for a dangerous
weapon" if [the officer] reasonably believes he or any
other person is in danger'.'
(1953 as amended).

Utah Code Annotated § 77 - 7-16

The Utah Statute is based on the United

States Supreme Court holding in Terry v. Ohio, supra,
which expressly limited such frisks to "that which is necessary
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the
officer or others nearby." 392 U.S. at 2.
In this case, the officer soecifically said that
he did not observe an object appearing to be
exterior of the pack.

gun through the

There were no other reasons voiced by

the officer that would justify any suspicion of weapons or
danger to the officer.

To the extent, the officer voiced any
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suspicion, it was that Appellant had stolen the handcart.
Where the contents of the backpack were discovered only as a
result of Appellant's illegal detention and/or arrest, without
suspicion of weapons, it should have been suppressed at trial.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
APPELLANT
This Court has held that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a verdict where "the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly have reached
a verdict bevond a reasonable doubt."
229, 231(Utah1980).

State v. Larrnn, 606 J?.2d

Recently, this Court reversed a con-

viction in a theft case where the evidence was de minimis

on

the issue of unauthorized control of an alleP-edly stolen motor
vehicle.

State v. Franks,

649 P.2d 3 (Utah ·1982).

In this case, the evidence on criminal intent was
de minimis.

Our svstem of justice is based on culpability

involving both an act and a mental state.
by itself.

Neither is sufficient

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) provides

that a theft by receiving occurswhen a person acts "with a purpose to deprive the owner" of property.

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504

(1953 as amended) is a general intent crime, not stating what
level of mental culpability is reouired.

However, Utah Code

Ann. §76-2-102 (1953 as amended) ~rovides that, where no mental
state is specified, intent, knowledge, or recklessness is
required.

Thus, the State had to prove that Appellant acted at
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least recklessly with respect to concealing the gun.
The State failed to nresent evidence to prove
A~pellant's

intent beyond a reasonable doubto

testified to

th~

The victims

fact that their home was burglarized.

Appellant

testified that he knew who had committed the burglary and theft;
how he had obtained the items from he burglary; and why he
had a pistol in his backpack.

Appellant testified that he

intended to return the items to the victims, but wanted
to do so without being labeled a "snitch."
had not called the police.

Consequently, he

Appellant also testified that he

was unaware he had the gun in his pack until he was on a
public street where he felt he could not withdraw it.
was no evidence to rebut

his testimony.

There

The State merely

relied on Appellant's actions of possessing the items from the
burglary and the gun.

This does not rise to nroaf beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellant either intended to deprive the
owners of this property or recklessly concealed a weaoon.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, the
lant seeks to have this Court either

1)

A~pel

reverse the trial

court's ruling which denied the motion to suppress and order
a new trial;

or

2)

reverse the judgment below on the basis

-20-
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that the evidence was insufficient to convict on the
offenses charged and order the entry of a judgment of
acquittal.
DATED this

~day

of February, 1983.

Respectfully submitted,

c~~/LINDA E. CARTER

Attorney for Anoellant

DELIVERED a.copy of the forep.oing to the Attorney

General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

day of February,

84114, this

1983.
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